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OPPORTWWlIE,C FOR POLICY HE!!oRIANs:~ - 
l3E EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. CIMLIAN SPACE PROGRAM 
One the most attrlctive features to mc of the U.S. s p x c  program 
as a subjm for historical study is its rc:ativ=ly finite ndturc. While thc Na- 
tional Aeronautics ;urd Space Administratior.'s (NASA's) probes and 
tclcropcs may be looking outward towvd the perhaps lirnitlcss edges of 
thc universe, the orginbation itself has had a lifc span of hardly a quarter 
oi'a century and for d l  of that time has been v c r ~  self-conlcious about the 
historical charzctcr of most of its activitia. It is difficult in g ~ n i r ~ l  for 
historians to reconstruct how events occurrcd and. cvcn more. w h ~  they 
occurrcd; I submit that, while stil! dX~cul t ,  it is compuativclv easier to 
undcnakc such reconstructions for thc Unitcd States space program. at 
least in its unclvsificd upccts, than for dmost any other human enter- 
prise of similar scope and h5torical magnitude. And tr, t3p it off, working 
on spacc history is one way for those of us without high technical com- 
petence to get ciosc to what is (to me at least) the grezt auvcnture of my 
lifetime. 
My interest, as a trained political scientist intcrcsted in whd? I call 
"policy histo?." is in andemandin$ why g.>vernrnen:s cndertake par- 
ticular courses of action (which is how ! dcfinc policy) and I r t  analyzing 
the institutions and p~ozcsses through which those courses of action arc 
carried out. I spend little timt on the equally iasclnzting history o t  
technologicd! developments per se. In what follows, I attcmp: w trace thc 
evolution of U.S. civilian spact policy and of the insrin~tional framcarori: 
through which that policy has bccn implcmented. Most of this policy 
history is uncharted rcrritory for the academic hatorian, althocgh t t z  
1957-1961 pcriod is more adeqcatcly described than thc two d:.:ddes 
s i ~ c e  then, and the groundwork for further acaivsis has bcen laid hy 
- 
Nl.S.4's continuing prcgram of commissioned an4 in-houx hisrories 
Government involvement with advanced science and technclogy has 
perhaps never been si ir~rensc as it has vecn ir, the spacr arcnz: there is 
much to record and to conternplat? in this involvenlcnt. Hopcfullp. the ac- 
count which follows can provide some cluzs to areas for  fertile historical 
analysic. 
Space Policy Principles: 1957- 1%2' 
There were, of course, space activities within the United States prior 
to the 19% launch of America's first satellite. hplorer 1. on January 3lst 
of t l ~ t  year. The military scirvices, panicu:arly *he Air Force, had initiated 
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early s~tcllitc projms. The United States had agreed to launch a scientific 
satellite as part of the 1ntcma:ional Geophysical Year. and the Vanguard 
project had k e n  authorized by President Eisenhower to meet the com- 
mitrr.ent. Vanguard was a second-priority project, explicitly forbidden 
from interfering with the requuements of the nation's crash missile pro- 
gruns, and did not achiwe a successful launch untii later in 1958. Even 
though it was carried out by the Office of Naval Research, it was 
predominantly a civilian program with limited scientific objeci;vcs. 
During the 1950s. others recognized the potentials of spacc. They in- 
cluded individuals wit!!in the various armed services, pvticularly the Air 
Fnrcc, because spacc activity xcmed a logical extension of its mission, and 
the Army, because iq the Wernhcr von Emun rocket team at the 
Rcdstone Arsenal in Alabama it possessed one of the leading groups of 
rocket engineers in the world aqd netdcd to find missions to keep that 
team at wo;k under Army direction. A few individuals within the civilian 
National ~dvisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) also were bcgin- 
ning to see that the organization's future might well lie in expanding its 
activitie into spacc, although NACA leadershi? did not adopt this 
posture until after the initial Soviet sv-ellite launch. 
Indeed, it was the shock of the Soviet Sputrlih in late i957 that 
gdlvanized the U S. debate on space poiicy ecd programs. That debate 
extended irom the late 1057 pcriod well into the carly years of the Ken- 
ned) administration. The poliq debare was oftcn acrimonious, with a 
widc varlery of persp~ctives represented and with strongly held i~miru- 
tional and personal pozitions. Tit ?rincipla which cmcrgcd fron, that 
debate and which are describe6 below were not solely. indeed not 
predominately, the result of so:ilc "rational" analysis of the appropriate 
basis for U.S. space policy; ;;kc most other public policies in the Unitcci 
States. they represented negotiated conipromiscs anlong conflictirrg in- 
terests. Hopefuliy. they also reflected some sense of the national interest 
in a new area of numan activity. 
A fundamental principle of U.S. spccc policy was that actz&s in 
spue could .5e f~y5et-i not only 5y scientifi payofi md i~ry  or in- 
tehgence applications, or potentid economi or socd bcnefis, but 
bypofitlccllobjecrives. That the fmt three of these motivations were legiti- 
mate rationales for U.S. space activity was establisneci early in the spacc 
policy debate. President Eis-~hower turned to his newly-established Prcsi- 
dent's Science Advisory Committee for .ounsel on the appropriate U.S. 
reaction to Sputnd, and those scientists included individuals who saw 
space as an exciting new arena for discovery. They recommended a pro- 
gram which focused on xicnr.6~ . :an; the science advisers were also 
concerned that space science not divert money away from other fields of 
science, but rather be planned as a separate part of the overill national 
scientific effort. Since the beginning of the U.S. program, space science 
has competed, on cne hand, with other types of space activities-par- 
ricu!arly manned spaceflight-for funds within NASA and. on the other 
hand, with other areas of science for a share of the government science 
budget. 
The national security community was qulck to sense the potentla1 of 
space as a important arena for military and intelligence activities, not 
primarily in terms of active military operation: but rather in terms of us- 
ing space technology to perform necessary militaiy support functions, 
such as communications, navigation, and weather forecasting. and 
sl~rveillance functions central to strategic intelligence. There was iitt!e 
question from the start that, when space offered a more effiiier~t or a 
unique way of achieving a military objective, the Department of Defense 
(DoD) would be authorized to sarty out military-oriented space projects. 
The debate in the early years arose about the limits of legitimate military 
objectives in space, since the most visionary among the military were sug- 
gesting "space planes," manned orbiting stations and lunar missions, 
strategic interplanetary forces, and other expensive and "far-out" projects 
as appropriatr military undertakings. 
The capability to operate in space was also recognized early on as 
having the potential to lead to applications with both social and economic 
benefits, and this poteqtial was seen a a legitimate justification for ex- 
pioratory proprams to investigate various applications. In particular, the 
potentials of space tcchnoiogy for meteorolog~cal observation and for 
relaying ccmmunications were recognized as a-eas of early payoff. and 
rapid!y puraied . 
The most vigorous area of debate in the early )ears of the U.S. space 
program was over whether strategic political objectives stch as national 
prestige ought to be pursued through SF-.- activity. The Eisenhower ad- 
ministration explicitly rejected the idea of using large space technology 
projects to compete in syrr,:wlic, prestige-oriented accompliihrr,:nts with 
the Soviet Union; Eisenhower insisted on a policy of "calm r wsel . ..ism" 
with respect to the political uses of spac? technolugy. This plicy was 
rcvL.xd by President Kcnnedv in Flay 1961. with his commitment to a 
man landing on the Moon ' oeforc this decade is out." Ken~ledy was 
stlaightforwaid i his rationale far A ~ l l o ;  as he said in the speech an- 
. . ilouncing hls dec!s:m, "no sing1 . space project in this perid will be more 
mciting, or more impressive to ma~.r i~- l  " The rnemoiandum prepared 
by Kennedy's advisers which recommt ded the lunar Ian Yng . ssioc to 
him was even more explicit, arguing that "our attainments [in space] are 
a major element in the international competition between the Soviet 
system and our own. The non-military , non-commercial, non-scientific 
but 'civilian' projects such as lunar and planetary exploration are. in this 
sense, part of the battle along the fluid front of the cold war. " 2  
A second principle of U.S. space policy, also established by President 
Kennedy, was that the United States shouldbe preeminent in dlareas of 
space activity, partiularly so in those areas involwing the demonstration of 
technological capabdity .) In addition to reirersing Eisenhower's policy of 
not undertaking space activities for political objectives. Kennedy also ac- 
cepted the recommendation that the United States zim for across-the- 
board supremacy in the development of space capabilities. Apollo was 
just the capstone of this commitment to preeminence. At the same time 
as he approved the lunar mission, Kennedy also agreed to a general ac- 
celeration of the development of U.S. space technology in booster 
development, nuclear rocket propulsion, communication satellites, and 
meteorological satellites. The emphasis in this strategy was on technology 
development, rather than a program balanced among scientific explora- 
tion, socially useful applications, and major technology projects. 
A third guiding principle for U.S. space activities was that civi/irn 
a ~ d  mditary space activities would be camid out in separate tnstitutiotral 
struczures. In the early stages of the debate on space policy, the military 
tried to build a case for a single national space program under military 
control; a similar claim reemerged, in muted form, in the early months of 
the Kennedy administration. However. both Congress and President 
Eisenhower quickly became convinced that there should be an explicit 
and clear separation between the civilian space activities of government 
and rhose aimed at military objectives. This conviction was reflected in the 
Eisenhower administration's proposal for organizing the national space 
program sent to Congress in 1958. and i t  was never seriously questioned 
during congressional debate. Nor was President Kenncdy receptive to the 
notion of integrating militzry and civilian space activities in a single 
agency, although such a suggestion was made as he assumed the presi- 
dency in 1961. As intelligence programs using s p a r  technology 
developed, they were carried out xnder yet anothr~  institutional 
framewcrk, and as civilian space applications reached the operational 
stage, they were assigned to a missicn agency withir. the government or 
transferred to the private sector. Further NASA, as the civilian space 
agency, was l~rnited to research and development work d a t e d  to civilian 
applications of space technology; the R&D necessary for military 2nd in- 
telligence missions was carried o s t  under the spansorship of those agen- 
cies, rsther than using NASA as a single R&D agency for all government 
space programs. Thus, from the start, the principle of pLial space pro- 
grams rather than a single g..vernment program embodied in a single in- 
stitutional structure was established. 
The decision to carry out the government's space activities in a plural 
institutional context implied the need for some form of effective coor- 
dination among separate programs and for come means of developing 
either mutually consistent space policies for each program or a single in- 
tegrated national space policy. A primary concern was whether space 
policy development required a distinct high-level mechanism reflecting its 
status as a presidential issue, or whether policy coordination could be ac- 
complished through the normal operations of the Executive Office. 
Various mechanisms for program coordination between defense and 
civilian space activities were established because of the recognition that, if 
there were to be no central space agency, some sich means were required 
to insure that there were no un-k-arranted duplications or overlaps in the 
various parts of the federal space effort. 
A fourth space policy piinciple was that NAS.4 wouldbe limitedto 
research and development activities only; IVASA would not operate space 
systems. * The notion that NASA was to be an R&D agency only was in- 
corporated in its organic act, and whenever a question of whether NASA's 
mandate sho~ild be extended to include at least the early operation of a 
fully developed space applications system has been raised,-the decision 
has been that NASA was required to transfer to some other entity any 
technology which had reachrd the operational stage. 
A fifth principle of U.S. space pnlicy was that while the government 
would actively encourage private-sector uses of space technology, the 
government would d o  sponsur research in areils o f  potentid commercd 
app/ccatrons in space. both to accelerate the developmen/ o f t h o ~ e  ap- 
plications mJ to prevevt pnuilte monopolies based on s p a t  technoiogy. 
This policy took several years to evolve. The forcing issue w a ~  the desirc of 
American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T\ to invest its own corporate 
funds in the development of a communications satellite, if only the 
government would agree to launch such a privately developed piece of 
hardware.4 The government monopolized the capability required to 
launch payloads into orbit, and that capability had been developed at 
public expense. For this and other reasons, there was controversy from the 
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start over the noticn of government assistance to a single corporation* in 
achieving, if not a monopoly, at least a strong initial advantage in the ex- 
ploitation of space communications. 
The Eisenhower administration was willing to leave research and 
development specifically related to civilian communications satellites to 
the private secior , but this policy was reversed in the early years of the 
Kennedy administration. Not only did the government take the initiative 
in establishing an entirely new entity, the Communications Satellite 
Corporation (COMSAT), to be the U.S. actor in operating international 
commercial space communications systems, but the President also 
au:horized NASA to invest public miney in communications satellire 
research and development, thereby helping firms other than AT&T to 
gain competence in this area without large commitments of their own 
resources. 
A final principle of U.S. space policy was that, although the 1958 
Act specified that NASA might "engage in a program of international 
cooperation," intemationd cooperation was second in pnority to 
nationdutic objectives and was to k pursued in the context of broader 
U.S. domestic and forelgn pofzcy goals. Both Presidents Eisenhower and 
Kennedy saw the potential for space being an arena of substantial interna- 
tional cooperation; this was one rationale offered for placing the U S. 
effort primarily under civilian control. However, President Kennedy, by 
setting preeminence in space technology as a high-priority pollcv goal, im- 
plicitly relegated international cooperation to a lower priority than com- 
petitive, nationalistic motivations for the U.S. space progrm. 
These six principles formed the policy framework within which at 
least the first decade of U.S. space activity took place. They were also the 
policy principles upon which an elaborate institutional structure for the 
national space program was developed. The main features of that struc- 
ture are described below. 
Institutional Evolution of the U.S. Space Program 
Institutions are created, at least ideally, to embody a particular set of 
policy choices. As policies change, institutions either adapt, are modified 
by external forces, or become obsolete. Although the basic institutional 
structure of the U.S. space program has remained stable over the past two 
decades, there has beer? a good deal of organizational adaptation. 
* Even one, like AT&T, which already had a virtual monopoly on long-distance transmission of voice 
and video communications. 
Whether the changes are adequate to current space policy directions is 
very n~uch a live question today. 
Separate Programs, Sepante Sttuautes 
The policy decision with the most direct impact on the structure of 
the U.S. space program was that calling for institutional separation within 
the government of the civilian and military space activities. In the im- 
mediate post-Sputnik period, when it was evident that some accelerated 
response to the Soviet space accomplishments by the United States was re- 
quired, there were a number of contenders for the job of managing the 
national effort. They included: 
a h g l e  agency for all government space progrzms managed by the 
nilitary, either at the level of the Secretary of Defense or by one of 
the armed services, most likely the Air Force; 
a new cabinet-level department of science and technology which, 
among its other responsibilities, would have charge of the civilian 
space effort; 
adding space to the responsibilities of the Atomic Energy 
Commission; 
expanding the responsibility of the National Advisory Committee 
for Aeronautics to include a substantiz' component of space 
activities: 
creating a new c~v:lian agency with a responsibility for government 
space activities, except those primarily associated with defense ap- 
plications (which would be managed by DoD). 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to detail the debate which led to 
the choice of creating a fundamentally new civilian space agency, 
although one arose around a core of technical capability transferred from 
NACA.5 Once the decision to separate civil and military space activities 
was made, the claims by the Department of Defense and by the armed 
services that they were the appropriate managers of the national space 
program found limited political support either within Congress or in the 
public (outside of those c2nstituencies with close connections to the 
.~ilitary). The idea that the U.S. space program in its civilian aspect: 
should be an open, unclassified effort was 7videly accepted amonz those 
concerned with shaping national space policy. 
As the government agency concerned with aeronautics research, 
NACA mounted a campaign to have space added to its activities. 
However, NACA was an introspective, research-o:ic..ied agency with 
little orientation toward major technological enterprises. Further, it was 
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an agency managed by a committee, not by d sir.gle executive; this was an 
administrative arrangement strongly preferred by the scientific comma- 
nity as a means of insulating from "politics" gwernment activities with 
strong scientific components. A similar form of organization had been ac- 
cepted for the Atomic Lnergy Commission and had been proposed for the 
National Science Foundation, but was vetoed by President Truman. 
What President Eise~lhower's administrative, bq~dgetary, and policy ad- 
visors wanted was an agency res9onsive to the policy directions ot the 
President, headed by a single individual responsible for implementing 
those polic!? directives, and with the capabilities for carrying out poten- 
tially major research and development activities. Those activities, it was 
thought, would be carried out within the aerospace industry under 
governmelit contract rather than "in-house" with federal laboratories. 
They thus concluded that the creation of an essentially new federal stmc- 
rure for space, but one built around the NACA core of technical capabil- 
ity and research institutions. was the appropriate route to g o .  
In the Natioqal Aeroriautics and Space Act of 1958, the primacy of 
civilian objectives in space was stated: I t  is the policy of the United States 
that aciivities in space should be: devoted to peaceful purposes for the 
benefit of all mankind"; and the respon,.bility for those zctivities was 
given to a civilian agency: "Such activities shall be the responsibility of 
and shall be directed by a civilian agency exercising control over 
aeronautical and space activities sponsored by the United States. . . ." 
One area of controversy in the development of the 1958 Space Act 
was whether the new space agency should be responsiblc for all spate 
K&D, including that ultimately to be used by the militai-y for defense ap- 
plications. The decision was :o make explicit from the start t '  oral 
separation of these two major caregories of space activities. wi . - .  ,ASA 
having no direct involvemen: in military work. Thus the Space Act also 
declared that the Department of Defense should have ~esponsibiliry for 
"activitie3 peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of 
weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the United States 
(including the research and development necessary to make effective pro. 
visions for the defense of *he United States)." 
The formal separation of the civilin:~ anc nilitary spate artivitie; into 
different institutional frameworks meant transferring to the new civilian 
space agency capabil~ties related to its mission but under military control 
and, particularly after NASA had been assigned [he lunar landing mis- 
sion, developing new capabilities required to carry out an active s p c e  
R&D cffon. Within thc Department of Dcfcnsc thcrc was a nccd to 
develop a spacc R&D and a spacc opcmtions structure, and to dctcrmine 
thc divi\.;n of responsibility between rhc lcvcf of thc Sccrctvy of Dcfcnsc 
and thc arious military xrviccs. h t h  thc NASA buildup and the 
devclor~ cent of thc initial military structure for spacc wcrc accompiishcd 
by thc cz :; 1960s. 
Witi..n thc first two y a n  of its existcncc. NASA had cransfcrrcd to it 
a number . f facilities. programs. and people that had formcriy been 
opcmting undcr military auspices. Thcx included. from the Army, the 
von Bram rockct dcvclopmcnt tcam at Huntsvillc, Alabama. which 
bccvnc thc core of thc Marshal! Spacc Flight Gntcr .  and the Jct Propul- 
sion Laboratory at thc CaISornia Institute of Technology. NASA was 
authorizcd to dcvclop scvcnl ncw ficid ccntcrs rclatcd to its mission. in- 
cluding thc Goddard Spacc Flight Ccntcr for scicncc and applications pro- 
grams and the Manncd Spacecraft Gn tc r  (iatcr the Johnson Spacc 
Ccntcr) for manncd programs, and to dcvclop a civilian launch facility at 
Cape Canavcral, Florida (htcr thc Kcnncdy Spacc Center).* Thew wcrc 
added ro thc rhrcc former NAC.4 ccntcrs: h g l c y .  Lewis. and Amcs. In 
addition. smallcr NACA facriitia at Wallops Island. Virginia. and Ed- 
wards Air Forcc Buc in California camc ~lndcr NASA control. By 1062. 
NASA had in place an impressive institutional capability, onc fully 
mobilized for rnetting a broad sct of narional objcctiva in space. 
This government institutional base for civilian spnx prog:ams was 
reinforce6 by the dcvclopmcnt of an claboratc external nctwork of 
organizations-industries. univenitia. and nonprorits-involved in 
carrying out t k  civilian space program undcr NASA contracts or grants. 
!.As space activ~iies matured, other government agencics. including thc 
Departmcnts of Agriculturc. Commerce; Encrg>-; Health. Education. and 
Welfare; and Interior zlso became ~nvolved in space-related activitics.) At 
the peak o i  the Apollo program in fmal year 1965. fully 94 percent of 
NASA's budget obligations went to external grants and contracts. and 
NASA's prime contractors in turn crsatcd a widc base of more spccializcd 
subconrractors. Of direct NASA procurements in that year. -9 percent 
went to business firms. 8 perccnt to educational institutions. 12 percent to 
other government agencics. and 1 percent ro nonprofit organizations. 
This patrern has remained consiwm ovcr the years; in fmal 1978. the 
same percentage (04%) of NASA's btldgc~ wcnt to extramural procure- 
rncnt, and the distribution among performcrs wa. similar-business 
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(81%); educational institutions (12% ); nonprofits (1 %); and other 
governrncnt agencia (6 % ). 
As thc dcvclopmcnt of govcrnmcnt spacc activities during thc 1960s 
and 1970s continued, thc separation bctwcen thc three components of 
government ?.ctivity--civilian. military. and intelligcncc-becunc quitc 
pronounccd. The govcrnrncnt dcvcloped and maintained x p v l i c  and 
distinct institutionrl structures for cach function. not only in tcrms of linc 
agencies within 4 c  cxccutivc branch. but also in terms of policy review. 
budget devclopr~c.it and rcvicw. and congressional ovcaight. lhcrc was 
coordination wrong thc ckmcna of thc govcrnmcnt spacc program, but 
it was limited in xopc in compariso.~ to thc x p m t c  momcntum 
dcvcloped b;i each clcmcnt of the governmcnt spacc effort. 
Thc KASA structure crcatcd by its first two adwinistntors. Kcith 
Glcnnan -nd James Wcbb. has rcmaincd basically unchanged during thc 
past cwb dccada. NASA Hcadquanen in Washington is mponsiblc for 
policy dcvclopmcnt. overall managcmcnt, -and tcchnKd direction of thc 
various components of the civilian spacc research prcgram. Tcchnirx! 
managcmcnt of rhox j p ~ ~ l f i c  projects is assigned to onc of thc various 
NASA ficld centers. NASA has adopted the "Air Fonc model" of 
agcncy-contractor relationships, in which most R&D work is pcrformcd 
outsidc the government by thc aerospace industry. The govcrnmcnt rok 
1. rhar of program and project initiator. tcchnkd monitor of contractor 
prtormance, arrd dscr of the rcsuits of thc R&D cffons. 
The set of ficld centers undcr NASA authority today is the samc as it 
was during the early 1960s." Bccausc NASA is rcsponsiblc for civilian 
space activities aimed at a number of different purposes, including 
scicncc. applications, and dwclopmcnt of tcchnotog~d clpability, and 
bccaux the rcsponsibility for cach of thosc missions is lodged in a dif- 
fcrcnt ficld ccnter, one of NASA Hcadquartcn' major responsibilitia is 
allocating priorities and raourca across thc NASA institutiond complcx. 
Thc vitality of various ficld ccntcrs is closely related to thc priority as- 
signed to particular types of spacc activities undcr that ccntcr's control, 
and thus thcre is strong institutional motivation to competc for puticu!ar 
emphase within thc overall NASA program. 
it may be useful to mention thc structurc for spacc policy within 
CC'I~~CSS. Aftcr creating two tcmporuy xlcct comrrittccs to deal with 
space policy in carly 1958, Iatcr that :?car Congress cstablishcd two new 
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standing committm to deal with civilian spacc matters. In the Senate this 
responsibility was given to the Committcc on Aeronautical and Space 
Sciences; in the H o w .  to thc Committcc on Science and Astronautics. 
Both of thcx committm derived their visibility and status within Con- 
gms from thc irnponancc of thc programs -they oversaw and their 
authority over thosc prognms. As long as the civilian spacc program was a 
matter of high national priority with major budgctuy supports. thcrc was 
a corresponding degree of status in being involved with thcx two congra- 
sional committees. However. as the rcsourm allocated to civilian spacc ac- 
tiv~ty declined after Apolb. Congrcss viewed space activities as just one 
among various science and technology programs of govcmmcnt. and dur- 
ing thc 19705 committcc jurisdictions and names were modified to rcficct 
this reality. Now NAS.4 and thc National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad- 
ministration (NOAA) programs ur rcvicwcd in the Snatc  by thc Sub- 
committct on Scicncc, Technology. and Space of the Cornmittcc on 
Commcrcc. Science. and Transportation; thcrc is no stparate Senate space 
committcc. In the Houx. thc Committee on Science u ~ d  Astronautics in 
1974 was renamed the Committcc on Science and Technology and its 
jurisdiction was broadened to covcr ma;  civilian sciencc and technology 
activities, mthcr than k i n g  fmuscd primarily on NASA efforts.* 
In summary. then, thc policy principle of scpvztc civilian. military, 
and intclligcncc spacc programs has resultcd in thc dcvcbpmcnt of 
separate and well-cstabiishcd institutional structures aimed at thox three 
objcctivcs. As the priority givcn to military applications of space has in- 
acucd,  the Dcpznmcnt of Dcfcnsc structure for cvrying out t h e  ac- 
tivities has become more elaborate. However, as the priority assigned to 
civilian spacc activ~ties has changed, thcrc has not been a corresponding 
modifiiation of the basic NASA instituticnal structurc or institutional 
style. although thc sizc of thc NASA work force m d  supporting network 
of contractors has diminished. 
This institutional base offers the potcntiv for rapid mobilization if 
the nation wcrc to decide to accelerate the pace of its civilian spacc effort. 
The conscqucnccs of allowing the NASA and contractor institutional 
bvcs to shrink further arc unclear. It may bc a r u n d  national invcstmcnt 
to maintain a strong institutional capability within the govcrnmcnt for 
civilian spacc dcvclopmcnt, even though that capability is not always bc- 
ing fullv utilized. On the other hand, it may also be apprcpriatc. as U.S. 
Mtltre and tnrclltgmc spxc p r q p m  arc aurhonzcd tn orhcr commtttm In bah H a u u  and 
knatc. rho rctnforra thc vpvatr c r r r u t ~  branth srnnturn for thc r h m  cmpmrnts of thc U S 
pmrncnt spacc p:opm. 
activities in spacc mature. to shift morc of the responsibility for program 
and project planning and dcvelopmcnt to the private sector, with a 
pardel diminution of govcrnmcnt's institutional involvcmcnt. 
In 1977-1978. undcr thc dimtion of a National Security Council 
Policy Rcvicw Cornmittcc. a major review of thc structure of thc national 
space program was carried out. That review validated thc fundamental 
principle of separating civilian and military spacc activities. It concludcd 
that "our current dirmion set forth in thc Space Act in 1958 is wcll- 
founded" and that "thc United States will maintain currcnt rcsponsibil- 
it! and management among thc various spacc programs." 
Thc dccision to xpuatc civilian, military, and intciligcncc spacc ac- 
tivities Icd naturally to thc rquircmcnt for policy and program coordina- 
tion among thox separate programs. Thc typc of policy coordination 
needed and mcchanisrns for coordination havc bccn, and continue to bc. 
controversial issue. The naturc of coodinarion at thc program lcvcl has 
bccn las problcmatic. and working-icvcl cooperation between civilian 
and military space efforts has h e n  the rulc. Howcvcr. occasional disputes 
have arisen ovcr. for cxlmple, proposed civilian uscs of technology 
dcvclopcd for national security purpoxs. 
During thc 1958 debatc on spacc policy, a major congressional con- 
crrn was the relationship bctwccn military and civilian objcctivcs in space 
and some broader xt of national interests. Seoatc h!ajority Lcadcr Lyndon 
Johnson. in particular. was convinccd that spacc policy bught to bc thc 
subjcct of prcsidcntial attention; thc Eixnhowcr administration was far 
kss convinccd that spacc policy dcxrvcd such high priority. Johnson 
wanted to efftct high-level policy coordination by creating an Exccutivc 
Office mechanism mdclcd on the National Sccurity Council but 
dcdicatcd specifically to aeronautical and zpwc activitics. Thc Eixnhowcr 
administr3r;on reluctantly accepted Johnson's notion as a pricc of gctting 
the spacc legislation through Congrcss. and a h'ational Aeronautics and 
Spacc Council was cstablishcd by the Space Act of 1958. l7-1~ Space Coun- 
cil was to be a high-lcvcl advisory body, chaired by rhc Prcsidcnt and con- 
sisting of the hcads of othcr agcncics conccrncd with spacc activities ar,d 
several nongovcrnmcnt mcmbcrs.* It was to wist and advise thc Prcsi- 
dent in developing a comprehcnsivc program of aeronautical and space 
Thcx nonglntrnmcnd rncmhrn wcm never appntcd and the p t l W  wcm cl~rntnatcd whcn 
thc Sprc Council rrr rcorpnizrd in 1'K)l 
activities, in assigning specific spacc missions to various agencies, and in 
rmlving diffcrcnccs among agcncics over spacc policy and programs. 
Although thc Eisenhower administration agreed to thc inclusion of 
thc Spacc Council in the legislation setting up thc national spacc effort. it 
ncver used thc mechanism. Rath,r, space policy undcr Eixnhowcr was 
dcvclopcd through National Security Council and Bumu of the Budgct 
channcls. Eixnhowcr bclicvcd that civilian and military functions in space 
dcvclopmcnt wcrc "scpamtc responsibilities requiring no coordinating 
body." Thus, in 1%0, he askcd Congrcss to abolish thc Spacc Council. 
This proposal was sidctrackcd by Lyndon Johnson. Whcn Kcnncdy 
won thc 1960 clcction, withJohnson as his Vicc Prcsidcnt. thc new Prcsi- 
dcnt was convinced to keep the S z ~ c c  Council, but to change the lcgisla- 
tion so It would k chaired by thc Vicc President. During thc Kcnncdy 
administration. thc Spacc Council hired its f i s t  staff mcmbcrs and played 
an activc role in dcvcloping the national policia which led to the Apollo 
program and thc administration's peetion on communication satellites. 
During thc r a t  of the 1760s. undcr the Johnson and Nixon administra- 
tions, the Spacc Council continued to exist. but at the margins of most 
spacc policy debates. It devclopcd a rclativcly largc (for the Executive Of- 
ficc) st& under thc leadership of Vicc Prcsidcnts Hubert Humphrey and 
Spiro Agncw. However. as the priority wigncd to civilian spacc programs 
continued to dccrcasc and as the scpuatc spacc activities of thc govcrn- 
mcnt prctty much wcnt thcu own ways, thc Space Council h a m e  rathcr 
a moribund institution. and in 1973, Prcsidcnt Nixon proposcd its 
dissolution. Congress raised no objection and the Spacc Council wcnt out 
of cxistcncc. 
Without a central policy coordinating mechanism during the 197% 
s~rcucs among various govcrnmcnt spacc activitics dcvclopcd. Scvcral of 
these were thc results of disagrccmcnts bttwccn NASA and DoD ovcr the 
appropriate national security constraints to bc applicd to civilian spacc cf- 
forts, particularly in thc Earth-observation uca. NASA-DoD rclationships 
with rcspcct to the Spacc Shuttlc program havc bccn another area of con- 
trovcrsy. It was thex stresxs, more than any othcr single influcncc, that 
kd to the Cartcr administration rcvicw of national spacc policy bcgun in 
1977. 
A major result of that rcvicw was thc reestablishment of a 
prcsidcntial-level policy rcvicw proccss for spacc. This process exists in thc 
form of a Policy Review Committee (Spacc). operating undcr National 
Security Council auspices, but chaired by thc Dircctor of thc Office of 
Science and Technology Policy. This committee provides a forum for 9 
involved federal agencies (including departments such as Intcrior and 
Agncufturt ) to air rbeh v i m  on space polq, ro dvisc the prtudmr on 
proposed changes in ~ t i o n a l  spare p o h .  to resolve dqmcs amow 
agencies, and to provide for rapid referral of spvc poliq Issues to tbc 
president for decision when required. Enlike the Spam C o d .  h e  
Polir! Rcvicw Committee (Spacci docs nor b v c  a standmg profesuod 
d mcture. Rztha. it is a rccopticm of ofc need to fo&c the 
channels of interaction among thc various componenrs of ~ o ~ r n r  
spvc b i n -  rather thvl hw poliq- and prqgro d.tspmes s d c d  
though the bud- rcvim process or otber means of interqcnn 
coordina~on . 
Tbc structures for coorhc ion  among dw- and ch-dun space 6- 
fom at rfic program Icvcl have had a rather &rent hen. than t h w  
for po!ic\- level coordmation. T"ne 1956 Space -4ci creatcd a mechrmm for 
coordination at this lwei. the Cil-&an M i h q  h n  CoIMIrter 
(CMLC I.  but that sntutoq commmee. like h e  Spxe Council. n.a a 
congress ion all?^-imposed srmcnut and was seldom used. Rather NA4S-4 
and DoD set up a number of working-lwei groups on kwes of lnttrcsr to 
borh agencies az the earl! years of the space program passed. The C,UC 
u-az cvenrualli- abolrshed and repIaced b) a non-sra~toq -4eronauti~ and 
A4~ronauucc Coordinating Board i .k4CB i .  abch formahzed the contam 
h v e n  NASA and DoD at the workmg lrvt! The .k4CB wat estab- 
M e d  b!- a 1960 N.4SA4-DoD agreemcni and w a  ~ I V C ~ ;  re.~onsibii~n hi
coordinatinp N.4S.4 and DoD actirrries so x, tro "avoid undesirable 
duplication and . . . achjcvc &-;ueni utiiizatio~ of avadabie resources" 
and undertake "the coordination of artirities in area. of common m- 
terest." The earl! years of the .4.\CB weir qiure produruve m :ems of 
data exchar,gcs and creating an awareness of ~ h a i  the other qencx's p k n  
wcrc: tbc AACB continues to w n  rda i -  as the p n m q  m e h a n m  for 
addressing major program ksucs of interest to DoD and !'i.45,4 rr, space 
Howrr~r. ; ~ z  ~ b t  scprarc NASA .d deft-nse programs hecamr more in- 
stituuonalizcd in the 196a and 1 T O s .  there ha. been a rmdenc) for coor- 
dnatlon bcrwtcn the progams to be defcnslve m character. I .e . . aimed ai 
protccring each agent!-'s oun proprams and "mri " 
Putting R e  Results into Opmtim 
In the I958 debate over space amr-iues. the norlon of operanrmv 
civiiian space sytcrns d ~ d  nor recerve much arrenuon. The Spacr Aci gavr 
h:ASJ4 the rcsponsibiiin. for mosr aeronautical and space art1vrrJe.r bur 
defined thosc activities 2 5 .  ( 1 1  "research i n l i ~  . . . praMeim of fl~gh: 
within and outside the Earch 's atmosphere' ' :  ( 2  1 "i3e dwelctpmenr. the 
constroctlon. tmkg and operation for research purposes of aerc~naut~cd 
and space vehicles"; and (3) "such other activities as may be required for 
the exploration of space." This languagc seemed to limit NASA to R&D 
activities, and that was the general undemanding of the agency's mission 
at the time. 
In one area, providing launch services to a variety of customers in- 
cluding other government agencies, COMSAT and other private sector 
firms. and other countria, NASA has gone beyond R&D to a clearly 
opcmtional role. Restriction to R&D has had little impact on NASA's cf- 
forts in space science and exploration or tcchnology development, but it 
has had a defmite impact in the space applications area. 
Limiting NASA to the R&D part of the job of bringing space ap- 
plications into being mcans that other users of space tcchnology are 
ncccssarily involved in the total application effort. NASA has developed 
an orientation towards "technology push" dforts rather than a tradition 
of close coupling with potential users of space technology who would cxer- 
cise "demand pull" on the development of space applications. While 
NASA has almost from its start included "tcchnology transfer'' functions 
in its organization. many obxrvcrs think that NASA has so far done an 
inadequate job of marketing its tcchnological capabilities to potential 
users of spacc application systems. 
While an emphasis on dcvcloping and demonstrating new technical 
apabilitia is often necessary to convince potential users of their value, 
especially in situations where no preexisting user community exists, most 
observers believe that NASA, particularly in its early years, put more stress 
on pushing the technological frontier in space applications than on 
dcvcloping tcchnology either in response to user demand or in anticipa- 
tion of the kinds af demands likely to arise as new capabilities became 
known. In addition, NASA has a history of emphasizing the development 
of constantly more sophisticated technology in its application programs 
nthcr than concentrating on bringing an adequate applications system in- 
to early operation. This is at least in some measure a reflection of the in- 
stitutional reality that, once NASA completes R&D for an applications 
program, it must transfer that program to some user outside of thc 
agency. There is an organizational tendency to attempt to hold on to pro- 
grams, even X that mcans prolonging the R&D phase beyond the socially 
optimum point.* Since thc early 1970% NASA appears to have put a 
higher priority on developing closer relationships with potential users of 
* Thcrc may br. of courx. tcchnical a~bd managcr~al as wcll as institut~onal r m s  why thc dcvclop- 
mcnt of a spacc application may rake longer than originally h o p 3  for Somc also suggcst that thcrc 
haw been innancts of prcmaturc shifts from R&D to operational status in spacc applications 
space technology, particularly in the remote sensing and advanced 
satellite communications areas. 
The first test of NASA's bias towards continuing R&D in applica- 
tions was in weather satellites. In the early 1960s, NASA's initial 
meteorological satellite program, which had been transferred fiom DoD, 
was called Tiros. As the agency in charge of space R&D, NASA regarded 
Tiros as only the first step in weather satellite development and wanted to 
go immediately to the creation of an advanced mcteorologicd satellite 
called Nimbus. The Weather Bureau within the Department of Com- 
merce. 3 potential user agency, had another point of view. Even this 
initial wcather satellite would markedly improve its services, and the 
Weather Bureau wanted NASA to focus on Tiros rather than initiate a 
new weather satellite program. However. it took several years and 
substantial bureaucratic conflict before NASA was willing to shift its em- 
phasis away from the advanced Nimbus development program back to 
completing Tiros and bringing it to an operational Eventually, 
NASA worked out an effective agreement with the Weather Bureau both 
to support ongoing meteorological satellite activities and to continue 
R&D on advanced sensors relevant to meteorological applications. 
The cgmplex history of the use of sstellita for remote sensiog of land 
and ocean areas demonstrates the institutional problems stemming from. 
among other sources, NASA's focus on R&D and its lack of close links 
with potential users of operational space systems. The debate over the ap- 
propriate development pace and management structure for the Landsat 
system has extended over a decade. A presidential decision to assign the 
operational responsibility for remote-sensing programs to NOAA has pro- 
vided only a partial resolution of the institutional aspects of that debate. 
A major issue as arrangements for operational land remote sensing 
have been debated over the past decade is whether NASA's charter ought 
to be revised to extend itr authority to the operation of space applications 
systems. The presidential directive of November 1979 ended this debate 
with the decision to keep NASA as an R&D agency in remote sensing and 
to assign civilian Earth observation operations within the goveinment to 
NOAA, even though there were other claimants, such as the Depart- 
ments of interior and Agriculture, to a share of the opera;ionai remote- 
sensing role. Throughout the Landsat program, NASA h z  emphasized 
the experimental nature of the early remote-sensing satellites. While it 
has worked with potential users to make them aware of possible applica- 
tions of Lrrndsat data to their programs, it has also proposed more ad- 
vanced sensors for orbital evaluation in later Landsat satellites. But it has 
not given priority attention to deveioping the g r o ~ n d  segment, including 
associated data management and information processing and dissemina- 
tions systems. required for early deployment of a first-generation opem- 
tiond remote-sensing system. 
Public Sector-Private Smot Relations 
NASA's relationships as an R&D agency for space with other poten- 
tial users of space applications are relatively underdeveloped; this is par- 
ticularly the case when those users arc not other government agencies, but 
rather private sector. profit-oriented f m s .  The appropriate division of 
responsibility between public and private organizations for research and 
development oriented towards commercial applications for space 
technology has been problematic since the start of the space age.* The 
area in which this issue initially surfaced is communications satellite 
research. The Eisenhower administration recognized that communication 
via satellite was an area of potential major economic payoff and decided, 
in keeping with its general pro-business orientation, that 
communications-satellite research should be left to those interested in 
making a profit in the area. Others, however, feared that allowing ~ n l g  
private entities to develop the technology of space communications meant 
in effect giving a virtual monopoly in that area to the corporation with the 
most resources available to invest in communications satellite research. 
AT&T. From the perspective of those interested in preventing monopoly 
power in new areas of human activity, such 4 development was not 
desirable. The situation was further clouded by the recognition that, even 
if AT&T or another private entity developed a communications satellite 
using its own funds. it would have to depend on a launch capability 
developed with public ml,ney to place that satcllite into orbit. Thus the 
Kennedy adrninist:ation reversed the Eisenhower policy of leaving com- 
munications satellite research to the private sector; President Kennedy 
authorized NASA to conduct a vigorous program of research in the com- 
munications satellite area. 
In 1961 and 1962, as an initial space communications capability ap- 
proached reality, there were those who thought that the government 
should not only be involved in communications satellite R&D and make 
the results of that research available to a variety of potential private sector 
firms for commercialization. but also that the government itself should 
* Of ruurw. th~s  problem 15 not ltrn~tcd ro the spacc uc:or Thc ttsuc of fcdcral pollclcs affccr~ng 
prnate-xtcor Innovatton. ~ncludmg Arcct *upport of clvlltan R&D. has becn a sublcct of much rcrcnt 
dtxuulon wtthln both thc cxccut~vc branrh and thc Congms 
take advantage of that rescvch and undertake the operational satellite 
communications role, returning the eventual profits to the Treasury. The 
advocates of this position were not able to gather majority support in the 
1962 debate over communications satellite policy. With the creation of a 
new institutim, the Communications Satellite Corporation-which had 
some aspects of public control, but was fundamentally a new private 
enterprise-the mtion that the government should go into the com- 
munications satellite business itself disappeared .9 
The precedent established during the communications satellite 
debate was that developing new applications of space technology with 
commercial potential and nurturing them to operational status is a mixed 
private sector-public xctor responsibility, with the appropriate division of 
roles to be determined on an ad hoc basis for each area of applications; the 
goal, however, is eventual private sector operation of space applications 
systems. In each area in which a space application has reached or ap- 
proached maturity, such as point-to-point communications and some ap- 
plications of remote sensing, business structures have emerged which 
operate as commercial enterprises related to that application. The govern- 
ment has continued to fund research in other areas of space applications 
with potential commercial utility, including space transportation, 
materials processing, and other aspects of remote sensing, with the hope 
of discovering whether there are indeed profitable opportunities for 
private sector involvement in those areas, and demonstrating to potential 
opcratorc what those opportunities are. It may be that continued govern- 
ment willingness to push the applications of space technology and to bear 
the costs and risks of the research, development, and demonstration 
phases of commercializing those applications is the only way for them to 
become reality, at least in the short to midterm. 
One area of policy and institutional controversy during the Nixon 
and Ford administrations was advanced communications. In 1973, NASA 
was ordered to end its communications R&D efforts, on the grounds that 
the space communications business was far enough advanced so that it 
should be totally a private sector responsibility. The consequence of this 
decision was that the U.S. private sector concentrated on only those 
aspects of space communications which had the promise of early commer- 
cial payoff. Other governments have provided R&D support for advanced 
space communications development, leading to increasing international 
competition with U.S. firms for sales of advanced communication 
satellites. This situation led the Carter administration in 1978 to decide 
that the potential economic and social benefits of communications 
stellites for both private and public sector use were not being adequately 
tended to by private sector R&D. The Carter administration reestablished 
a NASA research effon in the advanced space communications area and 
charged the National Telecommunications and Information Administra- 
tion of the Department of Commerce with assisting in market aggregation 
and possible development of domestic and international public satellite 
communication services. 
From "Preeminence" to "Leadership" 
In 196 1. John Kennedy committed the United States to a policy of 
* I  preeminence" in all areas of space activity. The notion that the United 
States should maintzin a position of "leadership" in space activity has 
been repeated by each chief executive since Kennedy. 
As other countries in Europe, Asia, and South America develop in- 
dependent space capabilities and as the Soviet Union continues an ex- 
tremely active space effort, the meanings for the 1980s of the terms 
"leadership" and "preeminence" are less than clear. One possibility is 
for the United States to compete with other nations across the board in all 
areas of space activity, from the development of large, permanent man- 
ned structures in orbit, through various types of space applications, to ex- 
ploration of the cosmos. Another option is to focus U.S. space priorities in 
areas of high national payoff (which would include international Icader- 
ship in those areas). Another option is to view application activities in 
space as competitors with Earth-bound enterprises, and to undertake 
tha'n only when they are the most efficient means of meeting broader na- 
tional objectives. 
The initial impact of the commitment to across-the-board 
preeminence was to create in NASA an agency with the structure, institu- 
tional relationships, ~ n d  organizational culttire needed to carry out a high 
prixity, nationally mobilized effort in the development of large scale 
technology. NASA, at least in formal terms, remains today an organiza- 
tion designed for such purposes, but the meaning of a national commit- 
ment to leadership in space activities is much less clear than it was during 
the peak of the Apolln progran~ in the mid 1960s. As space activities have 
matured, and as they promise to become even more a routine part of a 
variety of government and private sector activities over the coming 
decade, a major institutional issue is whether a single central space agency 
with the desire and structure for carrying out an integrated, high-piiority 
national space effort in the civilian sector is ar, anomaly. 
The International Context: Collaboration or Competition? 
During the 1960s. NASA developed international cooperative pro- 
grams which were clearly secondary in priority to using space technology 
as a demonstration of national technical resources. Almost all of NASA'r 
international activities were scientific in character* and were carried out 
under policy guidelines which kept them limited in nope, including the 
notions that cooperation had to be based on mutual scientific benefit and 
that there would be no exchange of funds between the United States and 
its partners in international space activities. ' 0  This limited concept of in- 
ternational cooperation was broadened during the 1970s to the applica- 
tions area, as a number of nations became interested in the Landsat pro- 
gram, building their own ground stations or otherwise receiving Landsat 
data, and for the first time paying NASA a fee for access to the remote- 
sensing satellites. Other applications efforts had international dimen- 
sions; f a  example, the Applications Technology Satellite and Com- 
munications Technology Satellite programs demonstrated some of thc 
uses of communications satellites for education and health care in both 
developing and industrialized countries. 
Also during the 1970s, there was limited use of international 
cooperation in space technology to serve what wete explicitly foreign 
policy goals. The leading example w a  U.S.-USSR cooperation in the 
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. Increasingly, the potential of space as a tool of 
our foreign assistance program and as a means of demonstrating our con- 
cern for the develoy ing countries has led to assistance prcigrams related to 
the utilization of remote-sensing data for a variety of thlld and fourth- 
world countries. 
During the same time period, there was the beginning of coopera- 
tion with our major industrial partners (and potential competitors) in 
space technology development. The European S;lace Agency assumed the 
responsibility for developing the Spacelab, which is to be flown on the 
Space Shuttle as a base for orbital scientific experiments requiring the 
presence of human experimenters. The relationships with other industrial 
countries with respect to space technology are, however, somewhat am- 
bivalent, because of possible economic returns on a substantial scale from 
space ac-ivities and because of the desire of the United States to either 
maintain or establish a competitive advantage in such areas of future 
economic payoffs. 
As other major nations develop advanced space technology, the mix- 
ture between international competition and international collaboration in 
space should be a dynamic one. Competition between U.S. and European 
A major cxccption was the set of international agrecmcnts rcquirrd to establish a global tracking 
network. 
launch vehicles for payloads in the 1980s is just one example. A number 
of issues being debated in international forums could affect U.S. civilian 
space activities in the coming decades. Examples are the actions of the 
World Administrative Radio Conferences in allocating frequencies (and 
potentially slots in geosynchronous orbit) and the debate in the United 
Nations on a Moon Treaty. 
The Soviet Union, West Germany. France. Japan, Brazil-and i:?- 
deed a number of other countries-are allocating significant resources to 
space R&D. In coming years, the U.S. civilian space program will function 
in a quite different international context than has been the case. The in- 
stitutional iinplications of this changed context-for example, how to 
relate space activities to foreign policy objectives and how to carry out the 
diplomacy required to support our space objectives-require 
examination. 
Current Space Policy Principles 
This section will examine the current status of space policy from the 
perspective of its relation to the present institutional structure of the na- 
tional space effort just described. The purpose of this examination is to 
identify those areas of institutivnal stress which will condition the ability 
of the United States to carry out whatever objectives for space it chooses in 
the 1980s and beyond. 
The space policy principles of the 1957-1962 period described earlier 
represented a consensus arrived at after vigorous debate and under the 
competitive stimulus of Soviet space accomplishments. The sense of 
urgency that led to this consensus, which included setting a challenging 
goal as a central theme of the U.S. national space F. )gram, has been 
largely missing in the 10-ycar debate on appropriate principles to guide 
U.S. efforts in space in the post-Apllo period. That policy debate, in- 
deed, still continues. Although some interim principles of U.S. space 
policy in 1980 are specified below, they do not command the kind of 
broad support among interested partie5 that the earlier set of policy prin- 
ciples did. A nurnber of views on the appropriate pace and direction of 
U.S. space activities and of the policy principles which should underpin 
those activities are still represented in the policy debate. 
The Carter administration articulated a U.S. space policy for the 
1980s. but challenges to this policy concept hav:, arisen from key members 
of both the Senate and the House, from various aerospace industry group: 
and representatives of the aerospace profession, and from the rapidly 
growing network of interest groups which focus on space policy.11 The 
. . k l y  poky smnce ofthe Reagan iabmstndon is, at the time of writing, 
still vay undeu. Lacking any coascosus on s y r e  policy, the U.S. civilivl 
spacc&iscont inu inghgc lyonrhtmomennund~bydK 
ApoUo project ?aL. the other high intensity &tics d the 1960s and 
contind during the 19705 with the dcotlopment of a new technolo@ 
capability for space o p t i o n -  in the form of the Space T-tion 
srstm- 
At issue in chc current space poky debate arc such putstions as: 
Should long-term goals for space b articulated. or should the U.S. 
civilian space program bc p t i m d y  an evolutionary undertaking? 
Lirhcrcaaecdfbracommitrnenttoarmjor~tcchoologiai 
enterprise, such as the development of a pennulent manned orbital 
facility, to SCIVC as a foal  point for the next decade in space. as 
Ape% did in the 19605 and the Space Shuttle in the 1970s? 
What rok should men (and women) play in future activities in 
space? 
How aggressively should the govemmcnt support the development 
and demonstration of ;rotmtd applications of space technology to 
provide bendits on Euth? 
A key clement of the original spacc policy was that certain types of 
spacc activities. plrticululy luge-scale demonstrations of technological 
apbility, would 5c undertaken for what were fundmentally political 
motivations. This poky. as was mentioned eulicr, was established by 
Resident Kennedy and was a r c v e d  of the set of justifurions for spacc 
progrzrs accepted by the Eisenhower administration. It appears as if the 
United States has returned to that original set of justifications. which saw 
the dcvelopm~t  of ;pace technology only as a means. not as an m d  in 
itself. The Carter administration in its space policy statement, noting that 
"more and more, space is becoming a place to work, " suggested that ' k- 
dlitics u ~ d  be pursued in space whcn it appem that notrond ob~ectives 
can most ejjkicntly be met through spae activities. " l2 
This policy principle is applicable most directly to the economic, 
social, and military applications of space technology. It recognizes the 
mpidly maturing state of space capabilities and suggests that space pro- 
gram ace incrc;lsingly recognized as mcans to some desirable end, not 
ends in themselves. Not only d o e  current policy rejm the notion of spacc 
as an arena for symbolic political competition, but it also indicates that 
there may bc limits on the investment 3f rrcsources in spacc activities 
limed at scientific returns. The .me  spacr poi.icy statement, while em- 
phasizing U.S. commiunent to a spacc science and exploration progmm 
tht ated fix "h--m &rib-* to impon hpcrl d t s "  
whcnncccnuy.Ihtcombinuioaofapnbn'rcquircmcntsfor<lan- 
cBmkxs ;md thc mognkh rhat p m d  &dam ammaims uc im- 
portant dctctminants of tbt kvd of gommncnt investment m space u- 
t m i t i t s ~ ~ 1 d c r p i n a m u c t r m o r e l i m i a d c o a c c p t d t h t ~ ~ y r r c  
r t i v i t i a o a t b c ~ & t h v l w a s t h c ~ l * ~ t h c s p o c c ~  
at 1%1. 
1tsbouMbcnomlthutbtanrceptofa"lorrardprofiit"fordK 
U.S. sprc program did wt originat= rith tbc & of Jimmy 
G r m . m C v r c r ~ p d w g v l s t o a k r g c d c g r c c , a ~ ~ ~ ~ o f  
that adopted during rbc rmmcdivc post-@olio paiod by Richvd 
N i x o n , w h o d i n  1 9 7 0 h  " w h a r a t d o i n ~ ~  bcmm mun 
b c t o m c a f l ~ m d d ~ p z n o f o u r ~ l i f r d r n u s t t b a d ~  
bt p k d  in conjuncuon with dl of tbc 0th uodtrnlungs which uc 
aka important to us." In 1972. thc Nixor: ;rdmiahrion did make a 
coinmianent to the Spacc Shurtk. a mak tcchndogy dcvekpmcnt pro- 
gram, but h t  dcckion. to a lvgc dcgrcc. m s  made without fcbuog it to 
my overridmg #a~ t  of policy o b j ;  thcrt was a gtacnlrrtd notion 
~takssorpcnsivcdmortflcribk~zbilityforrouunCsprcopen- 
6 0 N ~ L i L e l y t o ~ a ~ ~ i n v c s m ~ n t o f ~ r r s o u r r e s . ~ ~ ~ ~  
Shudc decision had fcw pu?lkk with thc k i o n  to go to the Moon 3 
dccadc earlier; it was a- cornmi-t to technow dcvciopmcnt 
without a c l c v  link :o an overriding politid cr other poky- + i .  
Thc G t c r  administration rcjmcd an ApoUo-like commitment :o 
anorha mzjor space technolog). projm. &ing that "it is ncithcr 
fcasibk nor neccssvy at ~ timc to commit the United States to a hlgh- 
chdkngc space mginccring initiative compambk to ApoUo."" 
The carlia space policy of the Unitcd States smacd prccrnincncc. 
particularly in its implcmcntation by large scale rcchnological cntcrpriscs. 
as an owmidi~g policy god. This principle has k n  r c p k d  by one 
whKh stresses bakaru among schrf ic  qm. oppkamms of s p e  
kchology. md recbnology rkvefopmenr. Within this balanced smrcg?- 
there is an anphasts on hh-oricntcd applications of space tcchnolog,. 
whcthcr they be social. economic. or military in naturc. This emphasis on 
balance among various t ypa  of spacc activities is also onc that ncms from 
earlier administrations. In thc sunc 1970 natcmcnt mentioned atrow. 
Richard Nixon had natcd "many critical probkms heft on this p h a  
m?kc high priority demands on our attcntion and resources. By no hcvls 
should wc diow our space program to stagnate. But-with thc cntirc 
h w r c  and thc entire unkrsc  before us--we should not try ro do 
cvaydmg ar oncc. Our approrh to spacc must be bold-but K must zlso 
bt ~ . " "  
M o i i  s p c d d y .  thc Unitcd Stata has given i d  priority ora 
d K ~ d t C P d t ~ o d t ~ d a n d p o t c n t h l m i l i u r y a p p l i a ~ d  
space tcchnobgy. A " g r d  smor" over the past dcadc hzs brm 
d. dcvclopmcnt. d a n o m c m k .  and op& of spaax-bad 
military s y s t m c  for curying out s ~ n t h l  military nlpport firnctims such 
as cominuniatior~, commud. and control; e v i y  warning; stmcgic 
,wrvdancc: navigation: md weather forcosting. An exp?nded list of 
military q p l i a t k s  in sp;ce is now under ~&~ and rm). be 
mom likely togain pditdand budgeurysuppon thsnanyofthccon- 
tmding applications of spacc tcchndogv for civilian purposes. 
Onc principk of U.S. spec policy cmblishcd in thc htc 19% has 
trtnancri ;d;d in thc current situaticn. That printipk is that &ik. 
d-. a ~ ' & k f i g ~  spocc atirrtirr*z d & e d  OICI in sepmue ia- 
s t i t u f i d  structxres. A mcnt  prcsidcntial rcvicw c o d i d  thc cumrnt 
mvrlgcmcnt relations in thc govcrnmcnt 's space &on; and thus NASA. 
DoD. thc intelligcncc commanity, and NOAA each remain rcsponsibk 
for dHcrcnt pua of the qavcmmcnt spare program. However. with the 
maturing of space tcchncg.qgi. &~lopcd under t k  various programs 
and with the c m p h i s  on i d  &~Knc): and resource comavation. 
thew is more cmpAPN t h  &fire on t r i s fm of~rchnohg~ ammg the 
1r0raous gmetnecnt spae pmgromr a d  on -loinr/j-fbn&d d j ~ i n d j -  
mzmgcdpmgr~ms emzkg mu&$& 06yict&es. 
Thc cmp5;lsis on tcchnoiogy-sharing and pint program will phcc 
increased dmad on mczhanizms for prognm as wcil as policy coordina- 
tion. Because it is in the nature of mosr hpc-xdc buraumtic orguriza- 
tions to resist sharing rcsourccs and to prrfcr individually m v l y d  pro- 
grams. and because military d d  intelligence Frognms can "hide" 
technology behind security classifnrtions. the kind of presidential and 
congcssiond pressure now being a c n e d  on the national space &on to 
suppon the idea of rcunrrcc-sharing is probably mcssu).. if thc win 
principle of maintaining the xparation bctwctn programs and attempt- 
ing to cvry our tmly national cffom arc to be successful. 
Another policy principk stemming from the beginning of thc U.S. 
space program which remaim unaltered is that NASA ir hkhd to 
msear'h a d  &~elopn=mt tuti~3ies 04 and wiU not opera  s p e  
systems. * NASA's role as an R&D-only agency was rcvalidatcd during the 
As m m t d  d m .  i. t ~ c ~ p t m  to rho pnnopk s NASA's opmc~omi r d r  as a pamkr d 
h r n h  amrn Tha mk s Itkck to bc rrrnmlncd o rhc Sprrr Shutrk rrxha mrnnc opcmnnrl 
status 
d-h cf s+tGwJ @- on rcmctc samhg in 1979. Amc.lg 
othcn. the NASA leadastup believed that the ycocy- d b~st amtinuc 
m d c a a m a i b u t i o n t o & c ~ ~ ~ b y r e s t r i c t i a g i t ~ ~  
to R4rD zctivitics. Aconscqueactofthis pdicypriacipk in a period in 
d i c h v u i o u s a p p k a t i o m o f ~ m h n d o g y . p P n i r u h r l y i n & d  
and ocrvl ob#mtion areas. appmach opcruionJ stuur is that some 
aher entity. cither public or private. mun be laigacd rcqmnsibiliry for 
the operation dspre lpplicuiom systems. Currently. ~ I C  rtsponsibility 
within govcmmcnt for Evth obmmkm 6rom sp;rrc has been lsngncd to 
r singk a g c q ,  N O M ,  rather than spreading it among #rml f c d d  
lgcncics or cmting a ncw govcmmcnt agency with &K mpon- 
srbilities for Eartb o b s c r v a k .  In coming p. NOAA may well 
bccomc as much of a paax ?gcnc)- as NASA is today, even though NASA 
will continue to do thc rcscarch kading towards op.mthal spare applica- 
tions. iricluding rclatcd ground scgmma, and will rontinuc its rok as the 
~gtnc)- in chargc of spwc xicncc and cxplontior.. 
Anotha policy principk which has r t m a i d  unchanged in gcncd 
fonn. but rather diffcrcnt in ojxntlorul rncming, is that the goslnrrnrrrt 
yjr/ ~ctic2/r encour-ge p"r& secfor iksw'Beenf in the uses o / C s p ~ ~  
trchnohgy. ~7hr;k aho sponso~g mrmh tk .w.eru of porcntd c o r r r w -  
dappIzi#ion. Thc dcvclopmcnt of rclatimships keen p d i c  scct.w 
and private m o r  intcrcsts in s p c  applications has proved a particularly 
diff~cult task. Thc transfer of the rcsults of gcvcmmcnt-hndcd rcscarch 
on commun~ations satciiitc technology to application in privatclp- 
owned. operational. communications satcllitc systems was straighdorward 
in comparison to arranging for privatc scctor involvement ir, areas such as 
mvig-tion* and. particularly, rcmotc xnsing. With civilian spacc ac- 
tivitia within thc govcmmcnt now dividcd brxwccn NASA. NOAA. and 
a numbcr of orhcr fcdcnl agcncia. relationships bctwctn thc private sec- 
tor and government spacc programs arc men morc cornplx. Printc smor 
involvcmcnt with NASA in thc daign of rcscarch &om in space applica- 
tions is likcly to continuc to bc ncccsary. as will be relationships btrwttn 
NOAA and privatc scctor entities intcmtcd in thc comnmid  porcntid 
of Earth obxnxtion s);stcnls. 
Finally. thc intcrnationd dimcnsiom of spacc activity arc receiving 
considerably morc artention at the prcxnt rime than had bctn thc cuc 
culicr. Congress has bccn particulariy intcrcstcd in intcmationd coopcn- 
tion in spec activitia. Bccaux other industrial countria arc dcvcloping 
* M ~ t d c k r o r t ' d m g t o r p r r r - b o r d ~ y u n x l ~ h o k d o u r ~ D d ) . u d m r t -  
mg that rapabil~tv a \a~Lhk  for cwllun appkarrna a pmmq probkmrhcrl NASA has unkmLcn 
miv i ~ n u d  4 rdrd ro --had naqarm u paarm-loatma r g a m  
substnntid dvilhn s p m  pragr~rns emphasizing apphtiom of space 
mhndogy. the United States frnds itstlf in a situation in whkh o w -  
~ s ~ d B j u c o o p & ~ s p a t z r m m i x e d Y i t b t A C p d r n t i d  
f i r ~ ~ u n u p c ~ i n a r t a r o f b g h ~ i c r a r d s o c r ; r r / p l r p f i  
Aloo,othcr&. p c ~ m o r c t h a n t h e U n i t c d S a t e s . s t i l l ~ c  
spscc prognms 2s mcurs ofenhancing nuiolul prestige. urd this motiv?- 
c i a 7  ammains coopakc &om. 3io clear policy principk rclaung to thc 
~ ~ l s p m s o f U . S . s p ; u e r t i v i t k h a s y c c ~ f r o m s p r c  
poky &but ofthc Iw h&; this is an a m  of policy derrkpmcnt 
rrhirh is "ripc" for inacvcd attention. 
.As a new stage in the codution of US. spire mivity is entered with 
the imm'ncnt launch of the Splct Shuuk, a meeting such as this-aimcd 
x fausing the attention of historial prof- on oppormniries for 
study pmcntcd by splcc pragnms-sttms ro me to be quite appropriate. 
Ihc sprt program desmres the attention of aodtmic historians and thcir 
studcnrs. btclusc academia provides the unconsulincd and broad- 
gauged context within which it can bc best understood. Future gcncra- 
rmns arc almost cmain to v i m  mankind's fm tcntativc expeditions away 
h m  iis homc p h c r  as major historical m a .  From t ! t  pcrspcctivc, it 
is a privikgc to bc in at thc beginning. 
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